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INTRODUCTION

It is a fundamental principle of the American criminal justice system
that the punishment for a crime should be proportional to the blameworthiness
of the individual who committed that crime.' Put differently, the less
blameworthy an individual is, the less severe his punishment should be. Yet,
recent advances in science and medicine indicate that the traditional bases that
the criminal justice system uses for evaluating a defendant's blameworthiness,
and therefore his sentence, may be inadequate.
Traditionally, the American criminal justice system presupposed free
will and autonomy and held all citizens equally accountable for their actions.
However, it is now increasingly apparent that the American people, heretofore
considered equal under the law, actually have vastly different mental capacities
for making decisions about criminal conduct.2 Experts now know that diseases,
injuries, and genetics affect each citizen's brain and brain development in
individually different ways. Consequently, providing appropriate punishment is
increasingly more difficult. In no context is this dilemma more obvious, nor its
consequences more grave, than in that of capital sentencing.
Anglo-American common law has long prohibited the execution of
offenders afflicted with certain mental conditions. In 1986, the Supreme Court
of the United States endorsed this tradition, holding that the execution of
offenders who are "mentally insane" is barred by the Eighth Amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment.4 The basis for this decision, according to the
Court, was that in order for a sentence of death to have its proper effect,
offenders must have such mental capacity as to be "[]aware of the punishment
they are about to suffer and why they are about to suffer it."'
In 2002, however, the Court fundamentally altered this jurisprudence.
It held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits an offender from being executed if

Amanda R. Evansburg, "But Your Honor, It's in His Genes:" The Case for Genetic
Impairments as Groundfor a Downward Departure Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines,
38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1565, 1584 (2001).
2
David
Eagleman,
The
Brain
on
Trial,
THE
ATLANTIC,
(last visited
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/07/the-brain-on-trial/8520/4/
Apr. 11, 2013).
John E. Theuman, Annotation, Propriety of Carrying Out Death Sentences Against
Mentally 1/lIndividuals, 11l A.L.R. 5TH 491 (2003).
4
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).
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the offender has been diagnosed as "mentally retarded."6 The Court reasoned
that if an offender's mental state is such that he is unable to "understand and
process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to
understand the reactions of others" then he is "less morally culpable" and not
deserving of the ultimate punishment.7 With this ruling, the Court made it clear
that it was not just an offender's capacity that was essential in determining the
constitutionality of his death sentence, but his culpability as well.
Furthermore, by banning the execution of offenders with one specific
diagnosis, the Court opened the door for other offenders with other diagnoses
to challenge their death sentences on the basis of insufficient culpability as
well. This door has been opened even wider by the aforementioned advances in
science and medicine, which have suggested that disease, injury, and genetics
affect brain development, perhaps rendering offenders less culpable, or less
blameworthy, for their crimes. In light of these advances, which suggest that
criminal choices and biology are "inseparable" from one another for the
purposes of considering blameworthiness and appropriate sentencing,9 many
experts from the medical and legal communities have already gone on the
record contending that courts and legislatures should extend categorical
exemption for all offenders who suffer from various other conditions that affect
the functioning of the brain.o
If courts and legislatures decide to adopt the positions offered by these
experts and extend categorical Eighth Amendment protections to any or all
offenders with conditions affecting brain function, capital punishment could be
for all intents and purposes abolished without the benefit of an up-or-down vote
on capital punishment itself. Such indirect prohibition would effectively
overcome the will of the people in capital punishment states and would fly in
the face of traditional democratic principles. This outcome seems particularly
possible in light of recent studies that have shown that the prevalence rate of
these conditions among capital offenders is extraordinarily high. 1 In other
words, if additional categorical exemptions are provided for offenders with
various other conditions affecting brain function, almost no offenders will be

6

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id. at 320.
8
Id.; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569, 571 (2005) (exempting death row
offenders who were under 18 years of age at the time of their capital offense, noting that as a
class, juveniles are categorically "less culpable than adults" because of their "lack of maturity"
and "underdeveloped sense of responsibility").
9
Eagleman, supra note 2.
10 See infra Part III.
I
Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal Insanity in
the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 51, 57 (2006).
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left eligible for the death penalty. 12 In short, the groundwork has been laid for
an indirect prohibition of the death penalty on the grounds that offenders with
certain conditions affecting brain function are less morally culpable for their
crimes and thus less deserving of the ultimate punishment.
This is a very attractive option for death penalty opponents13 who have
struggled for years to successfully carry out a direct attack on capital
punishment. Accordingly, it can be expected that courts and legislatures will
soon have to decide whether offenders with various other conditions affecting
brain function, such as severe psychiatric illnesses, traumatic brain injuries, and
genetic predispositions should receive the same categorical exemption from
capital punishment that mentally retarded offenders receive.
This Note argues that categorical exemption from capital punishment
should not be extended to additional classes of offenders because, as one legal
scholar put it, "[i]t is a fact that among those who are sane and legally
responsible there are appreciable degrees of mental impairment."l 4 While
recent advances in science and medicine may raise legitimate constitutional
concerns as to the true culpability of offenders afflicted with severe psychiatric
illnesses, traumatic brain injuries or genetic predispositions, these concerns can
be adequately addressed through individualized sentencing that takes into
account all of the factors of a given murder and a given murderer. Additional
categorical exemptions will likely only succeed in protecting a number of
murderers who are actually culpable enough to deserve capital punishment or
who would otherwise be deterred from committing a heinous capital murder.
Accordingly, with regard to capital sentencing, "there can and should be a
substantial measure of individualization."' 5
This Note is limited in two respects. First, while the significance of
conditions affecting brain function is highly relevant at the guilt phase of any
capital prosecution, this Note's analysis is strictly limited to the sentencing
phase. In other words, while it can be fairly claimed that a condition affecting
brain function renders an offender not responsible, this Note is not concerned
with legal responsibility. Rather, this Note is concerned with offenders' legal
culpability. Second, this Note recognizes that the constitutionality of capital
punishment, in general, is highly controversial and hotly debated. Nevertheless,
this Note accepts capital punishment's constitutionality as a premise of its
analysis.
Part II of this Note provides an overview of the Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence as it presently relates to offenders with conditions
12

Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A PsychiatricCan of Worms, 33 N.M. L. REv. 255,

289 (2003).
13

Id.

14 C.T. Dreschler, Annotation, Mental or Emotional Condition as DiminishingResponsibility
for Crime, 22 A.L.R. 3D 1228 (1968) (internal quotations omitted).
15
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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affecting brain function. This provides the framework for understanding what
the Court takes into account when determining whether a particular offender, or
class of offenders, should be exempted from capital punishment. Furthermore,
it sheds light on what factors need to be considered with regard to future
demands for categorical exemptions. Part III provides an overview of popular
arguments for additional categorical exemptions for offenders afflicted with
conditions affecting brain function and highlights the frailties of those
arguments. Part IV provides further support for the argument that offenders
with conditions affecting brain function, beyond those already exempted,
should not be provided categorical exemption from capital punishment. Part IV
also argues that individualized review is the proper way to determine
appropriate punishment. Ultimately, this Note concludes that additional
categorical exemptions for offenders with conditions affecting brain function
should not be adopted, but rather, each offender's case should be reviewed on
an individual basis.
II. BACKGROUND: THE SUPREME COURT'S EIGHTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING CAPITAL OFFENDERS WITH CONDITIONS
AFFECTING BRAIN FUNCTION

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted." 6 The Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment in
general;17 however, some uses of it have been deemed either excessive or cruel
and unusual. In determining whether a particular use of capital punishment is
unconstitutional, the Court has historically taken many factors into account.
These factors include the method of punishment, 8 society's penological
goals,1 9 and the proportionality between the punishment and the offense. 20 Of
particular importance, however, in cases such as those discussed here, is the
proportionality between the punishment and the offender's culpability. 2 1
16

U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (upholding constitutionality of lethal injection).
19 See John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REv. 899, 914 (2011) ("There are four primary theories of
punishment that might serve as a touchstone for proportionality review: retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation and rehabilitation. The Supreme Court has used these theories to determine the
proportionality of punishments . . . .").
20
See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (prohibiting capital punishment for crime of
rape).
21
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 590 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
magnitude of the punishment imposed must be related to the degree ... of the defendant's
blameworthiness" (citation omitted)).
17
18
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In evaluating proportionality, the Court requires "consideration of the
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense." 2 2 Additionally, the Court's own jurisprudence requires it to
undertake both subjective and objective considerations. While it is true that "in
the end [the justices'] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of
the acceptability of the death penalty" in a given case, such judgments "should
not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual justices." 23
Rather, an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment must
also be informed by objective factors to the maximum extent possible.2 4 In
other words, the constitutionality of a particular capital sentence can never be
solely rooted in the Justices' own subjective opinions or upon the subjective
opinions of qualified experts. 2 5 The Court must consider objective elements as
well.26
Specifically, in considering the constitutionality of a particular capital
sentence, a court must look to the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society," 2 7 the clearest and most reliable source of which
is the legislation enacted by the legislatures of the fifty states.28 In short, the
Court has adopted a process of "counting states" to find national consensus on
decency.29 If a majority of states, through their own legislative action, have
prohibited a particular use of the death penalty, then the Court deems that use
to be in violation of society's evolving standards of decency, and therefore
unconstitutional. It has been through this process that the Court has recently
gone about establishing categorical exemptions for particular classes of
offenders. To date, using this process, the Court has carved out capacity-based
exemptions for the mentally insane 30 and culpability-based exemptions for the
mentally retarded 3 ' and for offenders who were under the age of 18 at the time
of the offense.32 In order to best understand why additional categorical
exemptions should not be granted, it is instructive to analyze what has guided
the Court as it has gone about creating past exemptions.

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
Coker, 433 U.S. at 592, 597 (1977).
See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991).
Coker, 433 U.S. at 592, 597 (1977).
Id
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
Coker, 433 U.S. at 603.

29
Lyn Entzeroth, The Challenge and Dilemma of Charting a Course to Constitutionally
Protect the Severely Mentally Ill Capital Defendantfrom the Death Penalty, 44 AKRON L. REv.

529, 552 (2011).
31

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

32

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569, 571 (2005).

30
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Ford and Panetti:Exemptionsfor Offenders with Insufficient Mental
Capacity

In the case of Ford v. Wainwright,33 the petitioner, Ford, was convicted
of murder and sentenced to death.3 4 At the time of his conviction and
sentencing, Ford was apparently fully mentally competent, and no issue as to
his competence was ever raised.35 However, once he had been on death row for
a number of years, Ford began to exhibit signs of mental disturbance, including
severe delusions.36 Consequently, his counsel invoked a state statute, which set
in motion a series of psychiatric examinations for the purpose of determining
Ford's competency.37 After examination by five different psychiatrists, all five
doctors concluded that Ford suffered from severe mental illness.
Nevertheless, the Governor signed the death warrant. 39 Counsel then sought
habeas corpus relief in the federal courts without success, until ultimately
arriving at the Supreme Court.40
The Court concluded that executing an offender who was mentally
insane was a violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment. 4 1 Relying on common law principles, the Court focused on capital
punishment's historical justification of retribution. 42 Specifically, in a
concurring opinion,43 Justice Powell found that capital punishment's
"retributive force[] depends on the defendant's awareness of the penalty's
existence and purpose."4 Therefore, he concluded, offenders are incompetent
to be executed when they are "unaware of the punishment they are about to
suffer and why they are about to suffer it."AS Accordingly, in light of Ford's

33

477 U.S. 399 (1986).

34

Id. at 401.

35

Id.

36

Id at 402.

3

Id. at 403.

38

39

Id at 404.
Id.

40

Id

41

See id at 399.

42

Id.

43
Justice Marshall's opinion only commanded a four-vote plurality. Therefore, Justice
Powell's concurring opinion was, at the time, considered to be Ford's rule in accordance with the
Marks rule. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (holding that "when a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds").
4
Ford,477 U.S. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring).
45
Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).
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condition,4 6 the lower court rulings were reversed, and Ford's case was
remanded for a determination of his competency.47 In arriving at this
conclusion, Powell looked to "the modem practices of the States' S and found
that a focus on the offender's awareness was the "prevailing test."4 9 This
approach, known as the "cognitive test,"50 was later cited as Ford's controlling
precedent in many subsequent rulings because it states the narrowest ground
supporting the ruling in the case.5 ' This viewpoint, however, would soon
change.
In Panetti v. Quarterman,52 the Court undertook its first direct
interpretation of Ford. In that case, the petitioner, Panetti, was convicted of
capital murder and sentenced to death in spite of a well-documented history of
mental illness that included a "fragmented personality, delusions, and
hallucinations."5 3 Through counsel, Panetti claimed that his delusions 54
rendered him mentally incompetent to be executed under Ford because they
made him incapable of "understand[ing] the reasons [why] he was about to be
executed." 5 This claim failed in the state courts.56
Upon seeking habeas relief in the federal courts, the district court
similarly rejected Panetti's claim, explaining that the circuit precedent was
Justice Powell's "cognitive test."57 That is, to be eligible for execution, an
offender need "know no more than the fact of his impending execution and the
factual predicate for the execution;"'58 he need not "understand the reasons
[why] he [is] about to be executed." 59 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed and Panetti appealed to the Supreme Court.
Altering existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court declared
that Powell's "cognitive test" for competency was not Ford's rule. Rather, the

Ford did not believe that he was going to be executed. Id. at 422. Rather, he was under a
delusion that his family members were being held hostage and that he was the Pope. Id. at 402.
47
Id. at 418.
46

48

Id. at 419 (Powell, J., concurring).

49

Id. at 422 n.3.

so

Theuman, supranote 3.
See supra text accompanying note 43.
551 U.S. 930 (2007).

51
52

5

Id. at 936-37.

Panetti believed that his execution was part of spiritual warfare between angels and
demons. See id. at 954.
s5
Id. at 938.
56
Id. at 937.
54

5

Id. (citing Panetti v. Dretke, 401 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711 (W.D. Tex. 2004)).
Id at 942 (citing Panetti v. Dretke, 401 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711 (W.D. Tex. 2004)).

5

Id. at 938.
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Court indicated that Justice Marshall's plurality opinion 60 was Ford's rule and
referred to it in determining Panetti's competency. The Court dismissed Justice
Powell's Ford concurrence and the Fifth Circuit's reliance on it as "too
restrictive to afford a prisoner the protections granted by the Eighth
Amendment," noting that "Justice Powell wrote only for himself when he
articulated specific criteria." 6 1
The Court then went on to find that Panetti's delusions, and his failure
to understand why he was to be executed, rendered him incompetent for
execution. In doing so, the Court took guidance from Justice Marshall's Ford
plurality, specifically noting the "questionable retributive value of executing a
person who has no comprehension of why he [is being] stripped of his
fundamental right to life." 62
Although the Panetti Court added the new requirement that an offender
comprehend why he is being executed to the competency determination, the
Court nevertheless expressly "decline[d] to set down a rule governing all
competency determinations." 63 Instead, the Court left in place Ford's
requirement that trial courts have "substantial leeway" to determine exactly
what conditions render an offender incompetent for execution. 4 As such, after
Panetti, a court reviewing an offender's mental competency for execution must,
at a very minimum, determine that the offender is aware that he is going to be
put to death, that he understands that he is going to be put to death for
committing a murder, and that he is able to recognize that society views death
as an appropriate punishment for murder because of the "severity of the offense
and the objective of community vindication." 65
While Panetti clarified how to handle situations involving an offender
with deficient mental capacity, another intervening case had already established
a new basis upon which offenders with conditions affecting brain function
could challenge their death sentences. This case would drastically alter the
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.

Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for a four-vote plurality, concluded, first, that the
execution of an insane prisoner is of "questionable retributive value." Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399 (1986). Second, he added, such an execution "presents no example to others, and thus
has no deterrence value." Id. at 399. Third, Marshall found that such an execution "simply
offends humanity" because of the "natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing one who
has no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience." Id. at 399, 409-10. Finally, Marshall
emphasized the need to "protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of
understanding" and the need to "protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of
exacting mindless vengeance." Id.
61
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 956-57 (2007).
62
Id. at 957 (citing Ford,477 U.S. at 399, 409-410).
63
Id. at 960-61.
60

(
65

Ford,477 U.S. at 427 (Powell, J., concurring).
Panetti,551 U.S. at 958.
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Atkins and Roper: Exemptions for Offenders with Insufficient Moral
Culpability

In Atkins v. Virginia,6 6 the Court for the first time provided categorical
exemption from capital punishment to a specific class of offenders on the basis
of a medical diagnosis alone. There, the petitioner, Daryl Atkins, had been
convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder.6 7 At the sentencing
phase, the defense relied on a forensic psychologist who testified that Atkins
was "mildly mentally retarded," citing interviews, school records, court
records, and a standard intelligence test that indicated that the petitioner had an
IQ of fifty-nine. In spite of this testimony, the jury sentenced Atkins to
death.69 On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Atkins contended that his
mental retardation rendered him less morally culpable and that, as such, he
should be precluded from a sentence of death. Rejecting this argument, the
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence. 70 Atkins appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States.
In evaluating Atkins's claim, the Court first addressed the general
constitutionality of executing an offender with mental retardation. In so doing,
the Court examined society's values on the matter, emphasizing that "the
clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the
legislation enacted by the [States'] legislatures."n Upon completing a thorough
review of the state legislative action on the topic of executing mentally retarded
offenders, the Court discovered not only that there was a "large number of
States prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons," 72 but also that
there was a "complete absence of States passing legislation reinstating the
power to conduct such executions." Taking this into account, along with the
fact that all the legislatures that had elected to prohibit the execution of
mentally retarded offenders had done so overwhelmingly, the Court gleaned
"powerful evidence that . . . society views mentally retarded offenders as
categorically less culpable than the average criminal" and that accordingly,
execution of such offenders was cruel.74 Additionally, the Court added that
even among those states that did not prohibit the execution of mentally retarded

66
67
68

536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id. at 307.
Id. at 308-09.

Id. at 309.
Id. at 310.
71
Id. at 312 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
72
At the time of the Court's ruling, 18 of 38 death penalty jurisdictions prohibited the
execution of mentally retarded offenders. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16.
69

70

7
74

Id.
Id. at 3 16.
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offenders, only five states had actually executed an offender with an IQ below
seventy in the thirteen years preceding the Atkins ruling.75 Accordingly, the
Court found such executions to be "truly unusual."
Further propelling the Court's conclusion was the majority's own
subjective belief that mentally retarded offenders have such a diminished
mental capacity that they cannot "understand and process information,"
"abstract from mistakes and learn from experience" or otherwise "engage in
logical reasoning." 77 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the execution of such
offenders fails to serve society's penological interests of retribution and
deterrence. Specifically, the Court noted, these "cognitive and behavioral
impairments . . . make it less likely that [mentally retarded offenders] can

process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a
result, control their conduct based upon that information."79 As such, having
found the execution of mentally retarded offenders to be "cruel and unusual"
under both an objective and subjective analysis of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court invalidated the practice and expanded constitutional
protection to a new class of offenders. However, the practice of extending
categorical exemptions to specific classes of offenders did not end there.
Using similar reasoning in the 2005 case of Roper v. Simmons,80 the
Court extended categorical Eighth Amendment protection to offenders who
were under eighteen years of age at the time of their capital offense.8 ' In
addition to finding a national consensus that such an execution violated
evolving standards of decency,82 the Court also found that as a class, juveniles
are categorically "less culpable than adults" because of their "lack of maturity"
and "underdeveloped sense of responsibility.""
While Roper is not directly pertinent to the medical and scientific
matters with which this Note is primarily concerned, it is, considered in tandem
with Atkins, indicative of the Court's increasing willingness to extend
categorical exemptions to additional classes of offenders. At the same time that
the Court has shifted its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to this culpabilitybased analysis, advances in science and medicine have increased awareness of
the biological causes of human behavior and suggested that even more

76

n

Id
Id.

77

Id.

7
7

Id. at 304.
Id. at 305.

80

543 U.S. 551 (2005).

81

Id. at 578.

Id. at 552 (noting that thirty states prohibited capital punishment for those offenders who
were under the age of 18 at their time they committed a capital offense).
83
Id. at 569, 571.
82
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offenders may have reduced culpability. Consequently, there has been a
cacophony of calls for additional categorical exemptions from capital
punishment.84 Specifically, there have been calls for categorical exemptions for
offenders with severe psychiatric illnesses, for offenders with traumatic brain
injuries, and for offenders with genetic predispositions toward violence and
aggressive behavior. In order to best understand these arguments, the scientific
basis underlying each of them, and the reasons why they fail, it is instructive to
review each of the arguments in turn.
III. ADDITIONAL CLASSES OF OFFENDERS PROPOSED FOR CATEGORICAL
EXEMPTION FROM CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND WHY THEY SHOULD NOT BE
EXEMPTED
A.

Offenders with Severe PsychiatricIllnesses

In the wake of the Atkins and Roper decisions, the categorical
exemption most often advocated has been for capital offenders afflicted with
severe psychiatric illnesses.85 For example, former president of the American
Psychiatric Association, Dr. Alan Stone, has argued that "mental illness and
mental retardation have similar causes" and that "the mentally ill suffer from
many of the same limitations that diminish the blameworthiness of retarded
persons."86 Accordingly, he said, "it is equally indecent to execute the mentally

8
See, e.g., John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Killing the Non-Willing: Atkins, the
Volitionally Incapacitatedand the Death Penalty, 55 S.C. L. REv. 93 (2003) (arguing for a
categorical exemption for individuals with mental illness); Nita A. Farahany, Cruel and Unequal
Punishments, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 859, 863 (2009) (arguing that categorical exemption for
offenders with traumatic brain injury and frontal lobe damage is constitutionally required because
such offenders possess identical cognitive and behavioral capabilities as the mentally retarded
offenders protected under Atkins); Timothy S. Hall, Mental Status and Criminal CulpabilityAfter
Atkins v. Virginia, 29 U. DAYTON L. REv. 355 (2004) (arguing that mentally ill offenders have
functionally identical cognitive impairments to mentally retarded offender); Laurie T. Izutsu,
Applying Atkins v. Virginia to CapitalDefendants with Severe Mental Illness, 70 BROOK. L. REV.
995 (2005) (calling for a categorical exemption for offenders with severe psychiatric illness
because such offenders exhibit cognitive and behavioral impairments analogous to the
deficiencies exhibited by mentally retarded offenders protected under Atkins). See generally
Cecilee Price-Huish, Born to Kill? 'Aggression Genes' and their PotentialImpact on Sentencing
and the Criminal Justice System, 50 SMU L. REv. 603 (1997) (suggesting that genetic defects
reduce criminal culpability to the point of precluding death sentences); see also Nita A. Farahany
& James E. Coleman, Jr., Genetics and Responsibility: To Know the Criminalfrom the Crime, 69
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 115, 136 (2006) (contending "the tenets of criminal law must evolve to
comport with a more scientifically robust understanding of human behavior") (internal citations
omitted).
85
See supranote 84 and accompanying text.
86
Alan A. Stone, Supreme Court Decision Raises New Ethical Questions for Psychiatry,
PsYCHIATRIc TwIEs (Sept. 1, 2002), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/p02090lb.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2013).
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ill."8 7 Offering similar sentiments, psychologists Dr. Mark D. Cunningham and
Dr. Mark P. Vigen have suggested that "the death penalty is intended to punish
those murderers who are most morally culpable" and that as such, "there is a
miscarriage of that intent when it is visited upon individuals who are manifestly
damaged, deficient, or disturbed in their psychological development and
functioning."
The American Psychiatric Association, the American
Psychological Association, and the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill have
all adopted virtually identical positions.89
Arguments calling for Atkins-type protection for capital offenders with
severe psychiatric illnesses have also emanated from legal scholarship. 90
Recently, the American Bar Association also recommended a prohibition on
the imposition of the death penalty against persons with severe psychiatric
illnesses.91
Bolstering these arguments are recent advances in neuroimaging
technologies. Historically, psychiatric disorders, or diseases of the mind, were
largely diagnosed through observation, interviewing, and psychotherapy rather
than through physical means. However, it is now known that psychiatric
disorders are not always rooted in experiences, but also in the "biological
details of the brain."92 As such, even diseases of the mind can be diagnosed
with brain imaging technologies such as computer tomography ("CT")
scanning, functional magnetic resonance imaging ("fMRI"), positron emission
and
electroencephalography,
("PET")
scanning,
tomography
magnetoencephalography. 93
These technologies have enabled doctors to "literally look at, and into,
the brain[]," 94 helping them to "make inferences about the brain processes
underlying perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes."95 More specifically,
these technologies make brain problems more detectable and more easily linked
to aberrant behavior.96 The technologies do this by showing whether brain
structures are "intact" and by "reveal[ing] damage, atrophy, intrusions, and

87

Id.

Mark D. Cunningham & Mark P. Vigen, Death Row Inmate Characteristics,Adjustment
and Confinement: A CriticalReview of the Literature,20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 191 (2002).
88

89

Entzeroth, supra note 29, at 559-60 (internal citations omitted).

90
91

Id (internal citations omitted).

Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities,

30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 668 (2006).
92
Eagleman, supra note 2.

9

See Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imagingfor Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed,

2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 13-15 (2009).

9

Redding, supra note 11, at 56-57 (internal quotations omitted).
Jones et al., supra note 93, at 15.

96

Eagleman, supra note 2.

94
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developmental abnormalities." 97 For example, over the last twenty-five years,
brain imaging technologies have shown that persons with schizophrenia have
demonstrable decreases in brain matter.98 Accordingly, "psychiatrists no longer
think that schizophrenia is caused by traumatic experiences or failure to
negotiate childhood phases of psychological development. Instead, the
symptoms of schizophrenia are believed to reflect disrupted brain
circuitry . . . ."99

Brain imaging technologies have also indicated a biological basis for
other psychiatric disorders, such as Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
("ADHD") and low serotonin activity. 00 These disorders, prevalent among
prison populations, cause patients to exhibit impulsivity, inability to follow
rules, difficulties in social and professional settings, participation in dangerous
activities without regard for possible consequences, and other actions that
frequently underlie criminal behavior. 0 1
Brain imaging technologies, however, do not actually demonstrate any
degree of culpability. As one scholar put it, "legal responsibility for behavior is
a legal conclusion, not a scientific finding." 0 2 Moreover, "[t]o say that brain
features influence behavior relevant to crime does not mean that brain features
can necessarily explain why certain individuals behaved criminally."' 0 3 This is
because "[e]ach person's brain . .. is both anatomically and functionally
specialized" and because "behavior is a complex phenomenon, neither
attributable to single causes, nor easily parsed among multiple causes."l 04 As
such, however useful brain imaging technologies are in revealing the biological
bases of psychiatric illness, they only reveal a small fraction of what
contributes to criminal behavior. Therefore, it makes little sense to prohibit one
entire category of punishment based on a mere fraction of considerations when
a myriad of other considerations could quite well justify that punishment.
Furthermore, while some offenders afflicted with severe psychiatric
illnesses may suffer from many of the same limitations that diminish the
blameworthiness of retarded persons, this is not always true for all such
offenders. While mentally retarded persons are constantly impaired by their
condition, the severely mentally ill "may have periods of relative lucidity and

9
98

Jones et al., supra note 93, at 13.
Mossman, supra note 12, at 281.

99

Id. (internal citations omitted).

100

Id. at 283-84.
Id. at 283 (internal quotations omitted).
Jones et al., supra note 93, at 28.

10i
102
103

id

104

id
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lack of impairment."'o Put differently, offenders with severe psychiatric illness
"tend to have some good days; whereas, the judgment and foresight of a
mentally retarded person is always comparatively impaired."l 06 For example,
an offender with bipolar disorder may be "relatively normal much of the time"
but then turn psychotic during a manic phase. 0 7 Similarly, a schizophrenic can
often socially interact with others quite lucidly so long as the interaction is
"unrelated to some area of delusional significance." 08 Accordingly, as one
legal commentator put it, "[g]iven the fluctuating nature of the symptoms of
mental illness," it is inappropriate to say that a severely mentally ill murderer
can "never, as a matter of law, be as culpable as a 'normal' murderer."'o0 As
such, severely mentally ill murderers should not be categorically exempted
from capital punishment. Rather, their cases should be examined on an
individualized basis.
B.

Offenders with Traumatic Brain Injuries

Other offenders offered as possible candidates for categorical
exemption from the death penalty are those who have suffered traumatic brain
injuries, particularly to the frontal lobe of the brain." 0 The frontal lobe is the
part of a person's brain that "regulate[s] socially appropriate behavior and
suppresses impulses.""' When it is damaged, often by trauma, tumor, or
stroke,1 2 the afflicted person may suffer from "impairment[s] in judgment" or
become more likely to "commit impulsive or violent acts even though such acts
normally would be against that person's nature."" 3 Because frontal lobe
damage to the brain contributes to "emotionally impulsive actions,""l 4 some
have posited that it might be "a possible causal factor in violent crime."

1os Pamela A. Wilkins, Rethinking CategoricalProhibitionson CapitalPunishment: How the
Current Test Fails Mentally Ill Offenders and What to Do About It, 40 U. MEM. L. REv. 423, 443
(2009).
106

Id.

107

Id

108

Id.
Id.

109

110
See Farahany,supra note 84, at 859; see also Corena G. Larimer, Equal ProtectionFrom
Execution: Expanding Atkins to Include Mentally Impaired Offenders, 60 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
925 (2010).
"j
Abram S. Barth, A Double-Edged Sword: The Role of Neuroimaging in Federal Capital
Sentencing, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 501, 503 (2007).
112

Id.

113

Redding, supra note 11, at 60-61.
Barth, supra note 111, at 503.

114
115

Redding, supra note 11, at 57.
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Not surprisingly, like claims that the severely mentally ill should be
exempted from capital punishment, calls for the exemption of offenders with
traumatic brain injuries have also been supported by neuroimaging evidence. In
fact, many neuroimaging studies of murderers have "consistently found frontal
lobe abnormalities." 1 l 6 Accordingly, brain images such as fMRIs and PET
scans are often offered in capital post-conviction relief proceedings in support
of arguments that, due to a traumatic brain injury, the offender was
insufficiently culpable to be executed. 17
However, due to difficulties in defining the boundaries of a traumatic
brain injury category," 8 proponents have not advocated for a categorical
exemption per se. Rather, proponents have asserted that it is the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that exempts offenders with
traumatic brain injuries from execution because such offenders have "identical
cognitive, behavioral, and adaptive impairments" as the mentally retarded
offenders protected under Atkins.119
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." 20 This, according to the Supreme Court, requires states
to "treat like cases alike," and "unlike cases accordingly."' 2 1 As such, advocates
of the traumatic brain injury exemption assert that to treat these "like" cases
differently is to deny offenders with traumatic brain injuries the equal
protection of the laws. However, the argument that offenders with traumatic
brain injuries should be exempted from capital punishment because they are
identical to offenders with mental retardation is flawed.

Barth, supranote 111, at 504.
See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 102 S.W.3d 482, 499 (Ark. 2003); Cooper v. State, 739 So. 2d
82 (Fla. 1999); Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 193 (Tenn. 2000).
118
Many jurisdictions require a brain impairment to be "significant[]" before it can be asserted
as a reason to foreclose a sentence of death. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(1) (2006)
("significantly impaired"); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (1981) ("substantially impaired"); CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201(4) (West 1996) ("significantly impaired"); IND. CODE ANN. § 50-2-9(c)
(West 2010) ("substantially impaired"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI) (1990) ("significantly
impaired"); PA. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e) (West 2010) ("substantially impaired"); VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-264.4 (West 2010) ("significantly impaired"). To satisfy this threshold, a capital offender
must present "expert testimony that establishes a strong connection" between the defendant's
frontal lobe dysfunction and his conduct. Barth, supra note 111, at 521. Additionally, capital
offenders must also present neuroimaging evidence to support the claim. Id Accordingly, a
condemned offender is limited in that he cannot reasonably insist on categorical exemption when
the injury to his frontal lobes is not "significant" or "substantial."
119
Farahany, supra note 84, at 859.
120
U.S. CONsT. amend XIV, § 1.
121
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
116

"
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First, for the same reasons that brain imaging technologies are of
questionable value in assessing the culpability of the severely mentally ill, 12 2
they are of equally questionable value in assessing the culpability of offenders
with traumatic brain injuries. Second, while offenders with mental retardation
and offenders with traumatic brain injuries may be functionally and cognitively
similar, they are not functionally and cognitively equivalent in all cases.
Among individuals who are mentally retarded, there are separate categories of
mental retardation, but the categories "represent degrees of impairment rather
than different kinds of impairment."1 2 3 In other words, "a person with mild
retardation [as in Atkins] may be less impaired than one with moderate
retardation, but the nature of the impairment is fundamentally the same."l 24 The
same is not true for those with traumatic brain injuries. With mental retardation,
the symptoms remain common even if they vary in degree,125 yet with
traumatic brain injury a wide variety of injuries could occur, resulting in
different symptoms.12 6 As such, many people with traumatic brain injuries
retain the ability to restrain their actions. 12 7 Put simply, offenders with mental
retardation and offenders with traumatic brain injuries are not alike. While
mentally retarded offenders, with their common symptoms, can be fairly said to
uniformly share a reduced level of culpability, the same cannot be said of
offenders with traumatic brain injuries, who may have varying symptoms and
degrees of culpability. Therefore, the two groups can be treated differently
under the law.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the two groups are "alike," a state
legislature may nevertheless be warranted in classifying them separately. In
general, all government classifications of citizens must have a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest.12 8 Some classifications, such as those
based on race, however, are considered "suspect" and must be strictly
scrutinized.12 9 The Supreme Court has held that the mentally disabled are not a
"suspect class" for equal protection purposes and that as such, legislative
classification of them does not require heightened judicial scrutiny.130 Rather,
legislation classifying mentally disabled persons differently is "presumed valid

122

See supra Part III.A.

123

Wilkins, supra note 105, at 442.

124

id

125

id
Barth, supra note 111, at 514
Id.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).

126
127
128
129

id.

130

Id at 442.
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and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.", 3 1
The rational basis for classifying persons with mental retardation
separately from persons with traumatic brain injuries is the state's need to
prevent malingering among capital offenders.13 2 Unlike traumatic brain injury,
part of the diagnostic criteria for mental retardation is onset before the age of
eighteen. 3 3 "[B]y requiring that [capital offenders] provide some evidence that
[they] had cognitive deficiencies early in life," a state can prevent them from
malingering. 134 Without such a requirement, capital offenders could
conceivably feign mental retardation as adults, "simply to escape capital
punishment."l 35 Put simply, if offenders with traumatic brain injuries and
offenders with mental retardation are amalgamated into one classification, the
age of onset requirement for mental retardation will evaporate. This is because
an age requirement cannot be applied to those with traumatic brain injuries.
This all-encompassing classification would deprive the states of a key method
of verifying offenders' medical claims and pave the way for rampant
malingering. Given that the states have a legitimate interest in ensuring that
"only those who truly have a diminished culpability escape the death penalty
under Atkins" and that "requiring juvenile onset appears to be rationally related
to preventing any such fraud," such rationale is sufficient for classifying the
mentally retarded separately from those with traumatic brain injuries.' 36
The claim that the Equal Protection Clause categorically exempts
offenders with traumatic brain injuries from execution must fail. This is
because offenders with traumatic brain injuries are not identical to those with
mental retardation. Additionally, even in those cases where they are cognitively
the same, the state nevertheless has a rational basis for treating them
differently. Therefore, the appropriateness of imposing a sentence of death
upon a capital offender who has suffered a traumatic brain injury should
continue to be evaluated on an individualized basis.
C.

Offenders with Genetic PredispositionsToward Violence

Many capital offenders argue that they should be exempted from
because they have a genetic predisposition toward violence
punishment
capital

131

Id. at 441-442.

Larimer, supra note I10, at 943-944.
133 Farahany, supra note 84, at 884.
134
Larimer, supra note 110, at 943-944.
132

135
136

Id.
Id. at 944.
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or aggression, which purportedly reduces their culpability.137 Such geneticsbased claims, while not nearly as prevalent as calls for other categorical
exemptions, have also been suggested in legal commentaries. 3 3 Advocates
supporting the notion that some criminals are less morally culpable for their
crimes because of their genetic makeup overwhelmingly point to four separate
studies to back up their claims: (1) the XYY Chromosome studies, 3 9 (2) twin
studies,14 0 (3) adoption studies,14' and (4) studies of the gene for monoamine

oxidase A.142
In the 1960s, genetic scientists discovered that there is a "strong
correlation or causal connection between antisocial behavior and the presence
of an extra Y chromosome.'l 43 Human females have two X chromosomes and
most human males have one X chromosome and one Y chromosome.14 4
However, some males receive an extra Y chromosome, resulting in what is
known as the "XYY chromosome configuration." 45 Some studies suggest that
males with this XYY chromosome configuration are four times more likely to
have criminal records than males with the normal XY configuration.14 6 These
studies also indicate that many men with the XYY chromosome configuration
have "intellectual capacit[ies], sexual instincts, aggressive impulses, and
emotional responses" that result in "immaturity, defective development, or
inadequate control." 4 7
Claims that violent criminal behavior may be rooted in genetics have
also been supported by studies of twins raised apart from one another. In one
such study, scientists assessed over 100 sets of twins, both identical and

'
See Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1995); see also Deborah W. Denno, Revisiting the
Legal Link Between Genetics and Crime, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 209, 239 (2006) (detailing
twenty capital cases between 1994 and 2004 in which offenders challenged a death sentence on
the basis of genetic conditions).
138
See Evansburg, supra note 1, at 1573-74; see also Price-Huish,supra note 84, at 603.

13 See D.A. Price & A.J. Whatmore, Behavior Disorders and the Pattern of Crime Among
XYY Males Identified at a Maximum Security Hospital, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 533 (1967).
140
See Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr. et. al., Sources of Human Psychological Differences: The
Minnesota Study of Twins RearedApart, 250 ScL. 223 (1990).
141 See Samoff A. Mednick, Genetic Influences in Criminal Convictions: Evidence
from an
Adoption Cohort, 224 SCi. 891, 892 (1984).
142
See H.G. Brunner et. al., Abnormal Behavior Associated with a Point Mutation in the
StructuralGenefor Monoamine Oxidase A, 262 Sci. 578 (1993).
143
Maureen P. Coffey, The Genetic Defense: Excuse or Explanation?, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 353, 361 (1993).
144 Marcia Johnson, Genetic Technology and its Impact on Culpabilityfor Criminal Actions,
46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 443, 460 (1998) (internal citation omitted).
145
146
147

See id. at 460-61.

id.
Coffey, supra note 143, at 361.
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fraternal, and measured the similarities and differences in their behavior
characteristics and personality traits.148 The idea was that, given that identical
twins have identical genetic composition, and that fraternal twins have different
genetic makeup, there would be "a greater correlation between the behavioral
patterns of identical twins than between those of fraternal twins." 4 9 Each set of
twins was raised separately so as to avoid any suggestion that environmental
influences steered their behavior. Ultimately, the scientists' suspicions were
confirmed. The separated identical twins exhibited virtually identical behavior
characteristics while the separated fraternal twins did not. Accordingly, the
scientists concluded that "genetic factors exert a pronounced and pervasive
influence on behavioral variability."15 0
A very similar study of adopted children revealed analogous results,
further bolstering the notion that genes have a prominent influence on the
development of violent criminal behavior.' 5 ' The Danish study, conducted over
several decades, monitored the behavior of over 13,000 adoptees, their
biological parents and their adoptive parents. In the end, it was revealed that
adoptees whose biological parents had a criminal conviction were more likely
to have a criminal conviction themselves than were adoptees whose biological
parents had never had a criminal conviction.152 Although adoptive parents with
a criminal conviction also tended to produce adopted children with criminal
records, the scientists concluded that "only the biological parent's criminality
was associated with a statistically significant increment in the son's
criminality." 5 3
Another study, by Dutch scientist H.G. Brunner, discovered that males
who carry a mutated gene for monoamine oxidase, an enzyme that triggers
certain neurotransmitters in the brain, have distorted reactions to external
stimuli and have difficulty coping with stressful situations that people with the
normal gene find easy to manage.15 4 Accordingly, these males have shown to
be considerably more likely to exhibit impulsive, aggressive criminal behavior
such as rape, arson, and assault. 55 This study has led many to believe that there
might possibly be a gene for aggression and that there is a "correlative effect
between certain genes and violence."' 6

149

See Evansburg, supra note 1,at 1573-74.
Johnson, supranote 144, at 455-56.

15o

Evansburg, supranote 1, at 1574.

"'

Id at 1575.
Johnson, supra note 144, at 459-60.

148

152

Evansburg, supranote 1, at 1575.
154
Id. at 1572.
155 Matthew Jones, Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in Criminal Law: The True Impact of
the Genetic Revolution, 52 DUKE L.J. 1031, 1040 (2003).
153

156

Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss3/15

20

Coon: Drawing the Line at Atkins and Roper: The Case Against Additional
DRAWING THE LINE AT ATKINS AND ROPER

2013]

1241

In light of studies such as these, many experts have speculated that
criminals are born, not made, and that genetic makeup diminishes moral
culpability.157 Furthermore, these studies have led more and more criminal
defendants to offer evidence of genetic predispositions to challenge death
sentences after a finding of guilt.'58 As one scholarly article succinctly put it,
these defendants are arguing that they do not deserve capital punishment by
saying "it's not my bad character; it's my bad genes."l 5 9
However useful these arguments are for purposes of mitigation,
though, they in no way support the case for categorical exemption. First, the
science of genetics "does not support the perspective that human actions are
fixed or caused by genes."160 Rather, human behavior is a product of "a
complex interaction of biology and the environment."' 61 As such, having a
genetic predisposition toward violence does not automatically render an
offender less culpable. Too many other factors must be taken into account,
including some that could very well render an offender more culpable. For
example, if the offender were a racist, and his crime was motivated by racial
animus, his culpability would actually be higher, regardless of his genetics.
Second, having a genetic predisposition toward a certain behavior does not
necessarily mean that one will exhibit that behavior. This is because gene
expression can actually "be turned on and off by life events." 62 For example,
some people have a gene known as 5-HTT, which is associated with
depression, suicide, and aggression. Yet, unless persons carrying the gene are
actually exposed to stressful life events, they are no more likely to exhibit
depression, suicide, or aggression than persons without the gene. 6 3 Put
differently, a person could have a genetic predisposition toward violence
without ever acting violently. At the same time, one could have a genetic
predisposition toward violence and be violent for reasons other than the genetic
predisposition. Ultimately, the point is that "genetic differences alone do not
explain behavioral differences between individuals."' 6 4 As such, it makes little
sense to afford genetic differences so much weight in determining appropriate
sentencing among individuals. Put simply, individual differences should be
considered on an individualized basis.

15
58
5
160

See Coffey, supra note 143, at 361.
See Farahany & Coleman, supra note 84, at 128-30.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 116.

161

Id.

162

Erica Beecher-Monas, Circumventing Daubert in the Gene Pool, 43 TULSA
L. REv. 241,

255 (2007).
163

Id.

164

Farahany & Coleman, supra note 84, at 117.
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The foregoing Part has analyzed some of the specific arguments
presented by proponents of additional categorical exemptions and offered
rebuttals to those specific arguments accordingly. There are, however,
additional arguments against categorical exemptions, in general. The following
Part outlines those arguments.
IV. OTHER ARGUMENTS AGAINST ADDITIONAL CATEGORICAL EXEMPTIONS

The current state of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence indicates that there are two legal avenues by which condemned
offenders afflicted with one of the aforementioned conditions can seek to have
their death sentences invalidated.165 First, under the Ford-Panettiline of cases,
offenders can claim that they lack sufficient mental capacity to be executed.166
That is, that they cannot understand "the punishment they are about to suffer
and why they are about to suffer it,"l 61 or otherwise recognize that society
views death as an appropriate punishment for murder because of the "severity
of the offense and the objective of community vindication."1 68 While this
avenue is not a categorical exemption per se, and therefore is not directly
relevant to the ensuing analysis, it is important to keep in mind because, as a
viable option for offenders with conditions affecting brain function, it stands
for the idea that even without categorical exemption, such offenders are not
entirely without recourse.
The second avenue, an Atkins-type claim of insufficient culpability, is
where the aforementioned arguments over categorical exemption come to the
forefront of modem Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Atkins and Roper
suggest that offenders with conditions affecting brain function may be less
morally culpable and therefore less deserving of capital punishment. 169 More
specifically, the Atkins Court's reasoning suggests that if one diagnosis can
categorically preclude offenders from execution, then the same might apply for
other diagnoses as well. In fact, some experts have already suggested that "if a
psychiatric diagnosis is all that is required to lead courts to believe that retarded
defendants are not fully accountable for their acts, then consistency requires
courts to exempt [other] defendants from execution too."l 70
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, for a sentence of death to be
constitutionally proportional to a given offender, it need only comport with

165

See supraPart II.

166

See supraPart II.A.

167
168

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 423 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007).

169

See supraPart II.B.

170

Mossman, supra note 12, at 279-80 (internal citations omitted).
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basic, objective standards of decency.' 7 1 Again, in determining whether this is
the case, "state action is often determinative." 7 2 The Court has consistently
looked to state legislative action as the bellwether of decency. This has been
seen in cases such as where the Court sanctioned the modem death penalty
system, 173 prohibited capital punishment for rape,1 7 4 prohibited capital
punishment for offenders who are insane at the time of execution,' prohibited
capital punishment for juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen, 176
prohibited capital punishment for mentally retarded offenders,1 77 and prohibited
capital punishment for the rape of a child. 178 As one expert put it, "the future of
the constitutional death penalty exemption ... is as dependent on the state
legislative process as it is on the Court." 79
Presently, however, not a single capital punishment state provides
categorical exemptions for offenders afflicted with specific severe psychiatric
illnesses, traumatic brain injuries, or genetic predispositions. Accordingly,
under current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the likelihood for the Court to
extend categorical exemptions for offenders afflicted with these conditions is
exceedingly low. Therefore, if proponents of additional categorical exemptions
ultimately want them at the constitutional level, the Court is going to insist that
they first obtain enough state-level exemptions to constitute a national standard
of decency. As suggested above in response to the specific arguments for
categorical exemptions, and elaborated upon here, the capital punishment states
should not provide such exemptions.

Entzeroth, supra note 29, at 550 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 550 n.1 13 (internal citations omitted).
173
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (noting that thirty-five states passed revised
death penalty statutes, effectively re-instating the death penalty).
174
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977) (noting that only three states provided the
death penalty for rape of an adult in their revised post-Furmanstatutes).
17 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986) (noting that no state allowed the execution
of an offender who was deemed insane at the time of his execution).
176
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 552 (2005) (noting that thirty states prohibit the juvenile
death penalty).
177
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1989) (noting that eighteen of thirty-eight death
penalty states prohibited the execution of mentally retarded offenders).
17
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 408 (2008) (noting that thirty of thirty-six death
penalty states prohibited the execution of an offender for child rape).
17 Entzeroth, supra note 29, at 581.
171
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ConditionsAffecting Brain FunctionAre Largely Irrelevantin Capital
Cases
1.

Capital Punishment Is Regularly Restricted to Cases of
Premeditated and Deliberated Murder

The Supreme Court has held that the states' use of capital punishment
must be limited to a "narrow category of the most serious crimes."' 80 In
defining the parameters of this "narrow category," the Court has already
banned capital punishment for many crimes for which it has deemed death to
be a disproportionate punishment.18 ' Consequently, the capital punishment
states have been forced to restrict their capital crimes to a few isolated
charges. 182 In fact, the majority of capital punishment states only allow capital
punishment for first-degree murder. 83 To be guilty of first-degree murder, an
offender must "not only intend to kill, but in addition he must premeditate the
killing and deliberate about it."1 84 More specifically, the murderer must have a
"cool mind . .. capable of reflection" and he must "reflect, at least for a short
period of time before his act of killing."' 8 5
In light of these considerations, scientific evidence that suggests that
offenders with traumatic brain injuries or genetic disorders are prone to
"impulsive, aggressive criminal behavior" 86 or "impulsive . . . violent acts," is
irrelevant. Put simply, what difference does it make, for purposes of
determining culpability, if an offender is prone to impulsivity when he has been
convicted of, and sentenced for, a crime that required premeditation and
deliberation?

1so

Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.

181 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 408 (banning capital punishment for rape of a child);
Enmund v.

Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (banning capital punishment for felony-murder in which the
offender did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend for anyone to kill the victim); Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584 (1977) (banning capital punishment for rape).
182 Eighteen of thirty-four capital punishment states restrict capital punishment to
first-degree
murder. See Crimes Punishable by the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/crimes-punishable-death-penalty (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
Some states continue to permit execution for non-homicide offenses. See, e.g., LA. REV.STAT.
ANN. § 14:113 (2004) (treason); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-25-55(1) (West 1974) (air piracy),
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/crimes-punishable-death-penalty. However, no
state has actually executed an offender for a non-homicide offense since 1964. See Greg Stohr,
Child-Rape Case at Top Court May Let States Execute Non-Killers, BLOOMBERG.COM (Apr. 15,
2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ai0dyaaGrbds&refer-us.
183 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
184
1ss

2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBST. CRIM. L. § 14.7 (2d ed. 2003).
Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, CRIMINAL LAW § 73, at 563
(2d ed. 1986).
186 Jones, supra note 155, at 1040.
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The same can be asked about psychiatric disorders that are
characterized by impulsivity such as ADHD, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,
and low serotonin function.187 How can a propensity toward impulsivity matter
for the purposes of determining culpability when it has already been established
during the guilt-phase that the offender acted with "cool reflection"?
In determining proportionality under the Eighth Amendment, "the
Constitution demands that the punishment be tailored both to the nature of the
crime itself and to the defendant's 'personal responsibility and moral guilt."" 88
Therefore, if an offender has been convicted of a crime during which his
actions were not impulsive but cool and calculated, it is hard to see how his
culpability is diminished in any way even if he did suffer from a condition that
could arguably result in impulsivity. As such, the states that restrict their use of
capital punishment to cases of premeditated and deliberated murder have no
need to provide a categorical exemption for offenders with severe psychiatric
illnesses, traumatic brain injuries, or genetic predispositions because they do
not sentence murderers to death for impulsive murders in the first place.
2.

Society's Penological Goals of Deterrence and Retribution are
Often Achievable Even When Offenders Have Conditions
Affecting Brain Function

In response to the above argument that biological conditions causing
impulsivity are irrelevant to many states' use of capital punishment, it could be
argued that these conditions nevertheless preclude the fulfillment of any of
society's penological goals. The Supreme Court has held that if a given use of
capital punishment cannot "measurably contribute" to society's penological
goals of deterrence and retribution, then "it 'is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering' and hence an
unconstitutional punishment."' 8 9
With regard to deterrence, it could be argued that in light of the recent
advances in science and medicine that suggest that a condition affecting brain
function can render an offender so impulsive that he cannot "process the
information of the possibility of execution"l 90 and conform his conduct
accordingly, society's penological interest in deterrence cannot be served. This
argument, however, is demonstrably flawed. According to the Supreme Court,
"[t]he theory of deterrence in capital sentencing is predicated upon the notion
that increased severity of the punishment will inhibit criminal actors from

187

Mossman, supra note 12, at 281.

188 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 603 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(internal quotations omitted).
189 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (internal quotations omitted).
190

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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carrying out murderous conduct."' 9 ' This is particularly true, the Court has
noted, in cases where "the murder is the result of premeditation and
deliberation." 9 2 In other words, if the murderer can take the time to
premeditate and deliberate over his crime, then he can also take the time to
consider the severity of his punishment and potentially be inhibited from
carrying out the murderous conduct. If one is so cool and calculating that he
can premeditate and deliberate a murder, it is difficult to see how he is
simultaneously so impulsive that he cannot take pause to consider the
consequences of his crime.
With regard to retribution, the Court has indicated that society has an
"interest in seeing that [an] offender gets his 'just deserts."'l 9 3 That is, certain
punishments are justified simply because the offender deserves it.194 At the
same time, some punishments are not justified because the offender does not
deserve it. It could be argued, then, that offenders whose culpability is reduced
because they are afflicted with a condition affecting brain function can never be
truly deserving of death. This argument, too, is flawed. Culpability and
deservedness do not depend entirely on an offender's mental state but also on
the circumstances of the crime. In other words, sometimes an offender deserves
death even when his mental state might have arguably reduced his culpability.
The case of Timothy McVeigh is instructive. In 1997, McVeigh was
convicted and sentenced to death on eleven counts stemming from the April 19,
1995, bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, that resulted in the deaths of 168 people.'9 5 Although his lawyers
did not raise the issue at sentencing nor on appeal, it was later learned that
McVeigh likely suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder resulting from of
his service in the Gulf War.19 6 Under the theory that an offender with a
condition affecting brain function can never be culpable enough to be truly
deserving of a sentence of death, Timothy McVeigh would be exempted from
capital punishment. Yet this theory ignores the facts of the Oklahoma City
bombing.
Angered at the federal government's April 19, 1993, siege of the
Branch Davidian Compound in Waco, Texas, McVeigh plotted to "take some
type of positive offensive action against the federal government" on the two

191

Id. at 320.

192

Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799.

''

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
Wilkins, supra note 105, at 447.
United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 1998).
See Lou MICHEL & DAN HERBECK, AMERICAN TERRORIST: TIMOTHY

194
'9

196

MCVEIGH & THE

Robin Aitken, Inside Mc Veigh's Mind, BBC NEWS
(Jun. 11, 2001, 10:51 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1382540.stm; Nora Eisenberg,
The 'McVeigh Tapes:' A Crucial Addition, ALTERNET.ORG (Apr. 26, 2010, 8:36 PM),
http://noraeisenberg.wordpress.com/2010/04/26/the-mcveigh-tapes-a-crucial-addition/.
OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING 112-113 (2001);
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year anniversary of that siege.1 97 For more than six months before the bombing,
McVeigh carefully and deliberately planned the attack, buying or stealing
whatever he needed to construct the bomb.' 98 On three separate occasions in
September and October of 1994, McVeigh traveled to multiple states and, using
various aliases, purchased large quantities of ammonium nitrate and
nitromethane, major chemical components ultimately used in the construction
of the bomb.1 99 On other occasions during the same time period, again using an
alias, he sought to purchase additional bomb ingredients both in person and
through a prepaid telephone calling card.200 Unable to personally fund these
expensive purchases, McVeigh robbed gun dealers to obtain additional money
and stole whatever other ingredients he could not buy.201 Once all the bomb
components were assembled, McVeigh, using an alias, rented a number of
storage lockers across Kansas and stored the components there.202 As the date
of the planned attack drew closer, McVeigh made a special trip to Oklahoma
City to scout out his pre-selected target and determine how to best attack it. 20 3
On April 14, 1995, McVeigh purchased a getaway car and rented a Ryder
truck.
Using carefully drawn diagrams of the truck, the chemicals, the
explosives, and the fusing system, he constructed the bomb in the back of the
truck.20 5 Then, just days before the attack, McVeigh, with a co-conspirator,
positioned the getaway car in an alley near the Murrah building.206 He had
deliberately parked the car in that spot so a building would shield him from the
explosion as he made his escape. Additionally, he placed a sign in the car,
deceptively indicating that the car was disabled and asking that it not be
towed.207 Finally, on the day of the attack, McVeigh drove the Ryder truck to
Oklahoma City, parked it in front of the Murrah building, lit the fuse, and
sprinted to the getaway car.208 Among the 168 people killed were 15 children in
the building's day care center, which was visible from the front of the
building.20 9 McVeigh later told a psychiatrist that although he had seen that

197

Mc Veigh, 153 F.3d at 1177.

198

Id

199

Id.
id

200
201
202

203
204
205
206

Id.
id
Id. at 1178.
id.
id
id.

208

id
id.

209

Id at 1177.
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there was a day care center in the building, he proceeded with the attack
anyway because "the date was too important to put off."2 10
In light of all of these facts, it is clear that one can fairly make the
claim that Timothy McVeigh deserved a sentence of death. Even if McVeigh's
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder did reduce his moral culpability some degree,
the other facts of the case, namely the months of extensive premeditation and
planning, the careful plotting and deliberation, and the wanton, depraved nature
of the crime still support the idea that McVeigh's execution achieved
appropriate retribution. Put differently, the case of Timothy McVeigh
demonstrates that at some point, some crimes are so heinous that the offender
deserves a sentence of death even when he is afflicted with a condition
affecting brain function. While the McVeigh case is perhaps the clearest
example of how society's penological goal of retribution can be achieved, this
rationale has been applied in many state cases where courts considered
conditions affecting brain function as mitigating factors, but nevertheless
upheld a death sentence. 21 1
To reiterate, the point of the foregoing analysis is that however
compelling advances in science and medicine are to understanding the
biological causes of human behavior, the fact of the matter remains that they
are simply not relevant in a large number of capital cases. Nevertheless, even if
one insisted that they were relevant, such as in cases of an impulsive, nonpremeditated, and non-deliberated "felony-murder," the law can still provide
appropriate protection without resorting to categorical exemptions.
B.

CurrentEighth Amendment JurisprudenceAlready Provides Sufficient
ConstitutionalProtectionfor Offenders with ConditionsAffecting
Brain Function
1.

Capital Sentencing Authorities Are Required To Consider All
Evidence of Conditions Affecting Brain Function

The Court has held that, under the Eighth Amendment, the sentencing
authority in every capital case must consider "any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."2 12 Accordingly, the
capital offender afflicted with a condition affecting brain function is not
Primetime:

McVeigh's
Own
Words,
ABC
NEWS,
http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/story?id=132158&page=1 (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
211
See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 207 S.W.3d 24, 51 (Mo. 2006) (deliberate, heinous murder of
child outweighed offender's history of schizophrenia); Dennis v. State, 13 P.3d 434, 442 (Nev.
2000) (calculated, cold-blooded, unprovoked nature of killing outweighed offender's history of
chronic clinical depression); State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 366 (Utah 2001) (plotted, deliberate
murder of mother and baby outweighed offender's delusional disorder).
212
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
210

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss3/15

28

Coon: Drawing the Line at Atkins and Roper: The Case Against Additional
DRA WING THE LINE AT ATKINS AND ROPER

2013]

1249

entirely without recourse. If such an offender believes that his condition
significantly reduces his culpability, he need only introduce evidence in support
thereof and the sentencing authority must consider it. Furthermore, even if such
an offender fails in convincing the sentencing authority that his condition is
sufficiently mitigating, he can still seek post-conviction relief on a claim that
capital punishment is disproportionate in his case in light of his condition. In
fact, while the Court has never found that an offender's severe psychiatric
illness, traumatic brain injury, or genetic predisposition warranted a finding that
the death penalty was disproportionate in a particular case, the state courts
have.
For example, in Crook v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida found
death to be a disproportionate punishment because mitigating circumstances,
including damage to the frontal lobe of the offender's brain, outweighed the
aggravating circumstances of the murder.2 13 In doing so, the court deftly
identified the case's position along the spectrum of Eighth Amendment
culpability, noting that although the frontal lobe damage did not "rise to the
level of insanity so as to bar Crook's conviction for murder," and it did not
"rise to the level of mental retardation that would constitutionally limit his
sentence," the mental deficiency was so substantial that it merited "great
consideration in evaluating [the] defendant's culpability in a proportionality
assessment." 2 14 Other state courts have reached similar conclusions in
analogous cases.215 These cases show that the Supreme Court's requirement
that capital sentencing authorities give "full effect" to all mitigating factors
provides ample constitutional protection without having to go as far as
categorical exemption.
2.

Capital Sentencing Authorities Are Exempting Offenders with
Truly Insufficient Culpability

In recent years, death sentences in the United States have been in
"steady nationwide decline . . . even though the capital murder rate has

remained relatively constant."2 16 In fact, in almost each year from 1996-2010,
the number of death sentences handed down has decreased from the year

213

Crook v. State, 908 So. 2d 350, 358 (Fla. 2005).

214

id

See, e.g., State v. Roque, 141 P.3d 368, 405-406 (Ariz. 2006) (finding death sentence
disproportionate based on offender's schizophrenia); Giles v. State, 549 S.W.2d 479, 485 (Ark.
1977) (reducing death sentence to life imprisonment in light of jury's failure to find brain
damage as a mitigating factor), overruled on other grounds by Grillot v. State, 107 S.W.3d 136
(Ark. 2003).
216
Scott E. Sundby, The Death Penalty's Future: Charting the Crosscurrents of Declining
Death Sentences and the McVeigh Factor, 84 TEX. L. REv. 1929 (2006).
215
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before, culminating in an all-time low of 104 death sentences in 2010.217 This
decline has been consistent across all of the death penalty states and not a
single state has shown an upward trend in the number of death sentences it has
handed down during that time. 2 18 Additionally, according to one commentator,
"what has been particularly striking about this decline is that it has been
achieved essentially on a case-by-case basis." 2 19 That is, not a single major
capital punishment state has abolished the death penalty and even the Atkins
and Roper exemptions removed only a small number of offenders from the
death-eligible pool. 2 20 Therefore, given that this steady decline in death
sentences has occurred concurrently with the rise of scientific understanding of
human behavior, one can reasonably infer that capital sentencing authorities,
using individualized review, are already protecting those offenders with truly
insufficient culpability from death. This is especially true in light of the fact
that jurors in capital cases have reported "giving considerable weight to
neuroimaging evidence." 22 1 At the same time, this also suggests that those
offenders who are sentenced to death despite being afflicted with conditions
affecting brain function, are actually truly deserving of it.
The CategoricalExemptions in Atkins and Roper are Sui Generis

C.

One could challenge this Note's contention that individualized
sentencing provides sufficient constitutional protection for death row offenders
with severe psychiatric illnesses, traumatic brain injuries, and genetic
predispositions on the basis that analogous arguments from the Atkins and
222
Roper dissents were rejected. However, the categorical exemptions the Court
extended in Atkins and Roper are not analogous to those proposed for offenders
with severe psychiatric illnesses, traumatic brain injuries, or genetic
predispositions. The exempted categories in Atkins and Roper share two
obvious characteristics: constancy and definability. First, as Professor Pamela
Wilkins put it, "[tihe mentally retarded are impaired 24/7, so to speak." 2 23
Similarly, she pointed out, young people are "at all times ... immature as
compared to most adults."224 Yet, she has noted, the severely mentally ill are
not constantly impaired; they "may have periods of relative lucidity and lack of
217

Death Sentences

by

Year:

1977-2009,

DEATH

PENALTY

INFORMATION

CENTER,

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-year- 1977-2009 (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
218
Sundby, supra note 216, at 1955.
219

Id.

Id. at 1955-1956.
Redding, supra note 11, at 78.
222
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Roper v.
Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 587 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
223
Wilkins, supra note 105, at 443.
224
id
220

221
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impairment." 22 5 Along the same lines, gene expression does not constantly
appear either, it "may be turned on or off by life events." 2 26 Admittedly,
traumatic brain injuries seem to be "constant" in the sense that mental
retardation and juvenility are, yet they are not definable in the way that mental
retardation and juvenility are.
In Atkins, the Court cited multiple psychiatry manuals in determining
the bounds of the class for which it was providing an exemption. Specifically,
the Court cited the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders for
the purposes of showing that "mild mental retardation is typically used to
describe people with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70."227
Additionally, the Court cited the Essentials of WAISIII Assessment 60 to show
that "an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower. . . is typically considered the cutoff IQ
score for the intellectual functioning prong of the mental retardation
definition." 2 2 8 While the Court left the task of defining "mental retardation" to
the states, 229 the Court's reference to the quantifiable measurements in these
scientific manuals goes a long way toward drawing boundaries around the
exempted class. Even more obviously, in Roper, the Court drew the line of the
exempted class at the age of eighteen.2 30
The exempted categories in Atkins and Roper are clearly defined and
the boundaries are easily judicially administrable. The same cannot be said for
any potential class of offenders with severe psychiatric illnesses or traumatic
brain injuries. With psychiatric illnesses, there is a wide variety of diagnoses
that one could label "severe" that have different symptoms. 2 31 The same can be
said for offenders with traumatic brain injuries who have been referred to as a
"far more diffuse and much harder to define" class of people than those with
mental retardation.232 The science simply provides no quantifiable way to draw
boundaries around a potential class. These two potential classes are too broad,
too diverse, and too nebulous to warrant a categorical exemption.
It could be argued that, rather than exempting the severely mentally ill
or those with traumatic brain injuries generally, an exemption could be crafted
for specific psychiatric diagnoses, such as schizophrenia. In fact, the state of
Indiana is currently considering such an exemption.233 However, the problem
still remains that unlike persons with mental retardation who share common

225

Id

226

Beecher-Monas, supra note 162, at 255.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002).
id.
Id.at317.

227
228

229
230

231
232

233

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
Wilkins, supra note 105, at 443.
State v. Anderson, 996 So.2d 973, 987-988 (La. 2008).
Entzeroth, supra note 29, at 552.
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characteristics, persons with schizophrenia can demonstrate vastly differently
characteristics and behaviors. Therefore, even a diagnosis-specific exemption,
like the one proposed in Indiana, does little good for the purposes of providing
a workable boundary. Admittedly, a boundary could conceivably be drawn
around a genetic predisposition category, but as mentioned earlier, such a
category lacks the constancy that the Atkins and Roper categories have. To fall
within the Atkins and Roper framework, any category that could potentially be
exempted needs both constancy and definability.
Therefore, because the proposed categories of severe psychiatric
illnesses, traumatic brain injuries, and genetic predispositions are not all
characterized by both constancy and definability, individualized review
remains the only way to ensure fair and efficient administration of justice.
Moreover, individualized review will stand as a "limiting principle" that will
serve to prevent the Court from becoming what Justice Thurgood Marshall
famously warned against: "the ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal
responsibility" under the "aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments

Clause."2 3 4
D.

CategoricalExemptions Unfairly Stigmatize PersonsAfflicted with
Conditions Affecting Brain FunctionAs Morally Inferior

Psychiatrist Dr. Douglas Mossman has criticized categorical
exemptions as the erroneous approval of the practice of basing opinions about
moral capacities on peoples' biological conditions.23 5 Even in protecting people
with conditions affecting brain function, categorical exemptions simultaneously
"stigmatize[] those citizens as morally inferior by virtue of their mental
condition." 23 6 Admittedly, the very same argument could be fairly leveled
against the Atkins decision, which this Note supports leaving in place, yet the
argument presents a very legitimate concern, which states should take into
account when considering the extension of categorical exemptions to additional
classes of offenders. Categorical exemptions, it seems, are "tantamount to class
discrimination." 23 7 Worse yet, they fly in the face of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, which illegalizes "blanket decisions about people because of
mental disability-for example, denying them jobs, accommodations, or public
services out of the belief that their disability makes them less responsible."2 3 8

234

235
236

Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968).
Mossman, supra note 12, at 256.

id.

Id at 273 (quoting APA Council on Psychiatry and Law, Position Statement on
Discrimination Against Persons with Previous Psychiatric Treatment, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1042 (1997)).
237

238

id.
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Making the same point, psychologist (and attorney) Donald Bersoff has
pointed out that "[a]s important as it is to protect those who cannot protect
themselves, it is equally important to promote the right of all persons to make
their own choices, and, as a corollary, to be accountable for those choices."2 39
Moreover, he recognizes, to do otherwise is to relegate persons with conditions
affecting brain function to "second-class citizenship, potentially permitting the
State to abrogate the exercise of such fundamental interests as the right to
marry, to have and to rear one's children, to vote, or such every day
entitlements as entering into contracts or making a will." 2 40
A more "progressive" approach Dr. Mossman notes, would be "to
make individualized decisions about a defendant, taking into account his
mental condition, but not allowing it to determine his moral worth." 24 1 Despite
progressive arguments such as this, opponents of capital punishment have
elected to repudiate this approach, and have instead adopted a position that is
an affront to the millions of Americans afflicted with conditions affecting brain
function who, in their moral capacities, have chosen not commit atrocious
capital murders.
V. CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that increased knowledge of the biological
underpinnings of human behavior has raised genuine concerns as to the
constitutionality of capital punishment for some offenders afflicted with severe
psychiatric illnesses, traumatic brain injuries, or genetic predispositions toward
violence. Indeed, conditions affecting brain function may very well reduce the
culpability of some, if not many of these offenders, to the point that death is not
an appropriate punishment for them. However, the categorical exemption of
one hundred percent of these offenders from capital punishment is not the
proper response to these constitutional concerns. As indicated throughout this
Note, the reasons for this are as follows.
First, the science suggesting that there are biological roots beneath
criminal behavior simply does not support the claim that murderers with
conditions affecting brain function can "never, as a matter of law, be as
culpable as a 'normal' murderer."2 42 Rather, the science indicates that many
conditions affecting brain function express themselves periodically rather than
constantly.243 Therefore, even if a murderer does have a condition affecting

239
Id. (quoting Donald N. Bersoff, Some ContrarianConcerns About Law, Psychology, and
PublicPolicy, 26 LAW &HUM. BEHAV. 565, 568 (2002)).
240
Id. (quoting Donald N. Bersoff, Some ContrarianConcerns About Law, Psychology, and
PublicPolicy, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 565, 568 (2002)).
241
Id.
242
Wilkins, supra note 105, at 443.
243
See generally supra Part III.
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brain function, the condition does not necessarily play a role in the murder or
otherwise automatically render the murderer less culpable. Put differently, it is
entirely possible for at least some murderers afflicted with severe psychiatric
illness, traumatic brain injury, or a genetic predisposition to be sufficiently
culpable to deserve capital punishment in an appropriate case.244 The fact that
the science suggests that many murderers with these conditions are generally
less culpable for their misconduct than others does not necessarily mean that
some of them are not sufficiently culpable to deserve capital punishment.
Second, any class that seeks to receive categorical constitutional
protection needs to be clearly defined so that judicial administration can be
accomplished with ease. Some of the classes of capital offenders proposed for
additional categorical exemptions, unlike those classes already exempted,
cannot be clearly defined.245
Third, there is no reason for many states to extend categorical
exemptions to offenders with conditions affecting brain function because those
states restrict the use of capital punishment to crimes in which those conditions
are largely irrelevant.2 4 6 Specifically, capital punishment is regularly restricted
to cases of premeditated and deliberated murder. Biological conditions
affecting impulse control or causing uncontrolled, aggressive behavior do not
matter for the purposes of considering appropriate punishment for a person who
has already been convicted of premeditated and deliberated murder. That crime
is not characterized by impulsive or uncontrolled behavior. Rather, its main
feature is its cold and calculated nature.
Moreover, in many capital punishment states, the states' penological
goals of deterrence and retribution are often achievable. 24 7 Regarding
deterrence, it should be noted that when a murderer has been convicted of
committing a murder which he took the time to premeditate and deliberate, it
logically follows that he also had the time and capacity to consider the severity
of the potential punishment. Additionally, none of the scientific evidence
supports the idea that all offenders with conditions affecting brain function are
inherently incapable of being deterred by the prospect of capital punishment.
The fact that capital punishment may be less likely to deter many of these
offenders from committing a capital crime does not necessarily mean that the
threat cannot effectively deter some such offenders. It is entirely plausible for a
legislature considering providing categorical exemption to these offenders to
reasonably conclude that at least some of them can be deterred by the threat of
execution. This is especially important given that the deterrent effect of a
penalty is adequately vindicated if it successfully deters some, even if not all,
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of a target class. 24 8 As for retribution, it must be remembered that culpability
does not depend solely on the mental capacity of the offender, it also depends
upon the circumstances of the crime. 24 9 Therefore, as demonstrated by the case
of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, the circumstances of a given
crime can often justify the use of capital punishment and achieve society's goal
of retribution even when the murderer suffers from a condition affecting brain
function.
Fourth, additional categorical exemptions from capital punishment are
not necessary because the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence already
provides sufficient protection for offenders with conditions affecting brain
function.250 Specifically, the law already requires capital sentencing authorities
to consider all evidence of such conditions. In fact, statistical evidence of
rapidly declining death sentences, despite static capital murder rates, indicates
that capital sentencing authorities are, through individualized review, in fact
exempting those murderers who truly lack sufficient culpability to warrant a
sentence of death.25' Simultaneously, this evidence suggests that those
murderers who actually are sentenced to death are truly deserving of it.
Lastly, persons with conditions affecting brain function have fought for
years to establish themselves as equal, productive members of society who are
capable of making, and being wholly accountable for, their own choices.
Categorically exempting all murderers afflicted with conditions affecting brain
function unjustly brands all people with those conditions as morally inferior. 2 52
This is an insult to those citizens with conditions affecting brain function who
are not depraved murderers.
In conclusion, the appropriate alternative to categorically exempting
offenders with severe psychiatric illnesses, traumatic brain injuries, or genetic
predispositions from capital punishment is individualized review. This
approach takes into account all of the characteristics of a given murder and a
given murderer. Individualized review is judicially administrable, it is
scientifically and legally sensible, and it affords proper and adequate respect to
the moral worth of all citizens. Better yet, it is statistically shown to be
effective at distinguishing those without sufficient culpability from those who
are truly morally culpable and deserving of the ultimate punishment.
The categorical exemptions proposed for murderers with severe
psychiatric illnesses, traumatic brain injuries or genetic predispositions are
neither judicial administrable nor sensible. Worse, the proposed categorical
exemptions threaten to protect a number of murderers who are actually
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See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 351 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See supra Part IV.B. 1.
See supra Part IV.B.2.
See supra Part IV.D.
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culpable enough to deserve capital punishment or who would otherwise be
deterred from committing heinous capital murders.
States considering crafting statutory categorical exemptions from
capital punishment for offenders with conditions affecting brain function
should not do so. Instead, they should continue to use individualized review.
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